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ABSTRACT. A prevailing conceptualization of values in
organizations regards values as preferable modes of con-
duct or end-states of existence. Accordingly, values are
pursued through prescriptions, actions of implementation
and evaluation, based on the presumption that values
inform actions. Thus, holding the ‘right’ values leads to
desired practice. However, this is a problematic stance,
suppressing the fact that correlation between value and
action is highly questioned. The article claims that pro-
liferation of values in organizations is more plausible and
influential turning the process around, utilizing the ideas
of sensemaking, tacit knowledge and virtue in a critical
reflection-upon-action model, engaging organizational
members as co-researchers of their own value construc-
tions in context.
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The concept of value has been subject to a remark-
ably enduring interest over the last decades. This
holds true within social psychology (Argyris and
Schön, 1978; Furnham, 1997; Rocheach, 1973;
Rocheach and Ball-Rocheach, 1989), the realm of
ethics (Taylor, 1989), social anthropology (Hofstede,
1980; Inglehart, 1997) and not the least within the
organizational field (Argyris and Schön, 1978;
Gilliland et al., 2003; Meglino and Ravlin, 1998;
Schein, 1985). Interest in the domain of values is
pursued by professional practitioners as well as aca-
demics. Values are considered as the origin of action,
and may be cultivated as instruments to enhance
desired performance, i.e. productivity and efficiency.
This endeavour is parallel to a quest to improve
moral standards – either as a goal in its own right or
as a means to image building. Academics, on the
other hand, discuss the nature of values, their pre-
requisites, how values relate to behaviour, and
methods of studying value representation. However,
the link between an ideational level consisting of
values, attitudes, meanings and intentions, and a
level of actions, consisting of practice and human
behaviour is still debated.
The great efforts being employed in bringing
values ‘to work’ in organizations stage an interest in
investigating how the concept is being used, clari-
fying which theoretical frames it appears within and
discussing ways in which values may be approached
in the future. The related outcome of value research
results in highly different ways of conceptualizing
the role of values in professional practice. The most
common approach consists of treating values as more
or less objectively existing entities within a deduc-
tive–nomological perspective. A second approach
treats values as mental programs for action, which
accordingly is studied through interpretive research
models. This model of values research is predomi-
nant within the study of organizational culture.
Lastly, resent research perspectives may lead to value
research enhanced through collective reflective
sensemaking processes, engaging tacit knowledge
and observing values as sharing features with the
concept of virtue. This third approach, which will
be elaborated subsequently, may represent a way to
bridge the gap between value and action – not in an
absolute and predictive manner, but as a means to
increase sensitivity and alertness to existing meaning
constructs as well as latent meanings within practice
of an organization.
Value, intentionality and action
A discussion of how values may be approached in
professional practice, as well as in research, calls for a
clarification of the concept itself. Values are salient
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expressions of intentionality. Actions, on the other
hand, are dependent on distinctions of value to be
apprehended. ‘In order to see something, we need
concepts. Perception without conception is blind’
(Weick, 2006, p. 1726). The concept of value allows
perception of ways of making distinctions of worth.
Practice is intentional, valuing and established pat-
terns of action, placing value as a key concept within
language to comprehend actual behaviour.
The concept of value has been presented as ‘the
most striking fact about human life’ (Korsgaard,
1996), and as the core concept of human existence
(Pirsig, 1991). ‘Everybody that has experienced sit-
ting on a hot oven knows intuitively what values
are’, states Pirsig in his philosophical novel Lila, an
inquiry into morals. Accordingly, the ability of valuing
is the mark of humanity, indicating a greater
importance than, for example, the ability of applying
reason to enhance scientific progress. Thus, the
primacy of values implies the primacy of dealing
with questions of distribution, suppression, poverty
and environmental challenges. Within the organi-
zational field, the value issue raises – and partly
answers – core questions of why, when, where and how
on both grand and petty scales. These questions
coincide with challenges dealt with in theories of
ethics, which is why the field of ethics is increasingly
engaged in the development of organizational theory
as well as of professional practice. The concept of
value is an expression of human intentionality, being
enacted in forms of human behaviour.
Values are about valuing and evaluating. The term
is applied to a wide range of matters, extending from
formulations of pecuniary worth of items until
expressions of ideal or moral worth of actions. This
may be the part of the reason why there is an
unintentional multitude of value definitions. Still,
values are expressions of worth, or likes and dislikes
concerning things, persons, principles, attitudes,
beliefs, theories, as well as practices. Values are
expressed within language through the use of verbs
such as ‘want’, ‘prefer’, ‘hate’ and ‘despise’. It is
generally supposed that peoples’ values show certain
stability over time. Rocheach’s (1973) definition of
value is one of the most cited points of departure in
value research. He states that a value is ‘an enduring
belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of
existence is personally or socially preferable to an
opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state
of existence’. Another definition in the same line of
thought is the view that ‘values are standards or
criteria for choosing goals or guiding action and are
relatively enduring and stable over time’ (Dose,
1997, p. 220). A third definition states that a value is
‘a person’s internalized belief about how he or she
should or ought to behave’ (Meglino and Ravlin,
1998, p. 354). Values as (internalized) beliefs or
standards are open to the conscious mind as espoused
values. This perspective regards value systems as
patterns for behaviour.
In addition, it is generally supposed that values may
be inferred from actions. Individuals repeating a
coherent evaluating reaction, exposed to similar
situations, may be described as expressing stable val-
ues. Values demonstrated through behaviour may be
partially or wholly pre-conscious to the actor, and as
such tacit and hidden to his or her mind. The naming of
the value-in-use is for an observer to extract after
an action is performed. This aspect expresses value
systems as stable patterns of behaviour.
Hence, values are approached in two ways – as
espoused values and as values-in-use (Argyris and
Schön, 1978). Schein (1985) argues that once values
are taken for granted through repetitious practice,
they turn into preconceived basic assumptions.
Values-in-use and basic assumptions share the fea-
ture of being influential on actions, yet being hidden
to the conscious mind. Accordingly, values may be
studied along two tracks of investigation. On the
one hand, values are conscious verbal valuations
expressed by groups or individuals. The study of
values in this respect implies descriptions and mea-
surements of peoples‘ self-expressed likes and dis-
likes, and/or moral convictions (Inglehart, 1997;
Meglino and Ravlin, 1998). On the other hand,
values are nonverbal valuations more or less
unconsciously expressed through actions. Values of
the latter kind are for others to interpret on behalf of
the actor (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Schein, 1985;
Weick, 1995), or for the actor to interpret post fac-
tum. Hence, studying values in professional practice
calls for a close attention to empirical patterns of
behaviour, engaging hermeneutically inspired
methods of interpretation to bring forth sensible
value ‘headlines’ which most precisely catch the
‘mind of the action’.
Values are expressions of worth within language.
However, what kind of ‘reality’ do they express in
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comparison to other ‘words’? Intentionality denotes a
conceptual class in which the concept of value nat-
urally belongs. Intentionality is defined as ‘about-
ness’, denoting the ability of the human mind to be
focused (Dennett and Haugeland, 1987). Something
that is about something else is said to have inten-
tionality. Intentionality is often called ‘the mark of
the mental’, expressing the human ability of having
ideas, beliefs, desires, thoughts, hopes, fears, per-
ceptions, dreams, hallucinations – and values. These
‘propositional attitudes’ are mental states with
intentionality (Jacob, 2003, Chap. 10). Jacob states a
duality of the intentionality of the mental, and dis-
tinguishes between mind-to-world and world-to-
mind directions of fit (ibid.). He cites Anscombe
(1957, p. 56) who exemplifies this with the case of a
‘shopping list’. The list may either be used as
instructions for purchasing the right items by a cus-
tomer or it can be used as an inventory by a detective
whose challenge is to draw a record of what the
customer actually is buying. In the first case, the
shopping list should not be corrected in the light of
the contents of the shopping bag. However, in the
latter case, the fact of the grocery bag puts the blame
on the customer, and the detective should adjust his
list according to the facts of the bag. Thus, inten-
tionality is wider than mere intention. A shopping list
is a list of conscious intentions, but the contents of the
bag reveals a more comprehensive mental activity of
impulses, hidden desires and temptations – which are
expressions of the wider intentionality.
This duality of intentionality is parallel to the dual
approach to the study of values. Values viewed as
mind-to-world intentionality are expressed through
the numerous espoused value statements of organi-
zations (‘shopping lists’), and in the research aiming
at precise descriptions and measurements of the
effects of values and value congruence (Meglino and
Ravlin, 1998). Values in the shape of world-to-mind
intentionality point to the description, interpretation
and sensemaking of professional behaviour. Values-
in-use are to be deduced, or punctuated from a ‘list of
features’ of practices. Reflection on tacit values-in-
use may inspire the organization to adjust its practice
and its espoused values to be more in congruence
with what they actually aspire to. This ‘reflexive
interpretation’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000) may
inspire creativity, as well as make the organization
more trustworthy.
A crucial question is how the link between value
and action functions. Behaviour may be defined as
what happens when energy is consumed to produce
motion in living organisms. Action is human behav-
iour expressing intention or meaning. Accordingly,
organizational behaviour is human action, which is
studied either (1) as a product of sets of contingencies
(which may be altered), or (2) as expressions of
internal motives, intentions and values. Since human
behaviour at times seems to lack obvious conscious
reason, the need for employing sensemaking efforts
arises to establish some order of meaning behind the
pattern of action at hand. Thus, the latter endeavour
infers meaning and intentionality as central to action,
while the former approach underlines the interplay
among contingent forces. In both cases, however,
there is a general acceptance of the fact that value and
action are mutually interrelated, but exact description
of the interrelationship has yet to be presented.
The making of differences (Derrida, 1978) consti-
tutes our conceived world. This implies valuing as a
key activity within ‘languaging’. How meaning and
value are established in professional practice rely
less on strategic planning and rational choice, than
on what Weick calls ‘committed interpretation’
(Weick, 2001, p. 14). Sense is built through social
interaction, where more or less random action seeks
justification, gets publicly accepted, and ends up as
‘the way’ things should be understood and done.
Since value is a core expression of what is considered
sensible and worthy, there should be good reason to
investigate organizational values following this per-
spective, which will be done in a later section of the
article.
In order to summarize, values are constructs of
worth, being espoused in language as goals, ideals
and preferences, or extracted from actions through
processes of interpretive sensemaking. Values are
expressions of intentionality and show a close, but
not closed interrelationship with action.
Critical discussion
Values make important differences. When R. Scott
brought his men to a cold death in the hazardous
quest for the South Pole, it may be argued that his
Victorian gentleman values gave him no choice: the
glory of the empire and the honour of the crown
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was at stake and admitted no cowardice even if this
subsequently would have saved their lives. However,
even though this might be a convincing story – the
question of whether there is a way to be sure of the
correspondence of values and actions calls for special
attention.
The formerly cited value definitions lead to the
idea that specific human behaviour in a specific way
is contingent to specific espoused values. However,
this stance is open to serious interrogation. If such a
notion was true, then specific value-inspired inten-
tions would correlate to specific choices of action.
This presupposition, despite its failure to convince,
still comprises the underlying logic of much values
research, as well as being a major reason why orga-
nizations are extensively preoccupied with values
issues. In Denmark, nine out of ten companies have
an articulated set of values, and five out of ten claim
that they act according to this shared set of values in
their daily activities (Mejlby, 2003, p. 111).
According to this notion, a focus on ‘right’ values
would infer ‘right’ actions within an institution. The
frequently used term, implementing values, is a sign of
the prevalence of this belief, treating values as
technical ends being obtainable through planning,
structuring and administering individual preferences
and valences held by people. The usual strategy of
values proliferation is cast in the iron cage of
prediction-control, following Weber’s goal towards
attaining rationality. This is a splendid way of
structuring time and resources to achieve technical
ends, but this logical structure bears within itself a
meaning construct contrary to the nature of values
and virtues (MacIntyre, 1985). Building parking lots
and strengthening the company’s competence in
marketing call for a different type of knowledge than
developing respect and benevolence. Still, the sub-
ject/object (SO)-model (Scherer, 2003, p. 316)
treats both types of challenges based on a similar
frame of reference.
The prevailing connection underlining the
SO-model between value and action may be illus-
trated in a four-step model:
1. A moral principle of preference is established
as ‘right value’. How this may be done, is
one of the main questions of moral philoso-
phy as well as social sciences, and will not be
discussed due to space limitations.1
2. An actor intends to act according to his/her
value.
3. An action is performed according to the
intention informed by value.
4. The action is social, which means that others
are exposed to it. The action is thereby
interpreted by others being inflicted by the
action, employing corresponding or deviating
value standards of distinction to judge the
action.
This taxonomy of progress from value to action is
paralleled by a commonly used recipe for enhancing
values in organizations and professional practice.
1. Values are singled out, either by top manage-
ment and/or by the society of professionals.
2. Strategies, planned activities, campaigns and
education are being carried through, aiming
at development of ‘right’ intentionality/val-
ues by the members.
3. Armed with good intentions/values there is
an expectancy of enhancing professional
behaviour corresponding with the chosen
values.
4. Finally, evaluation is being carried out, either
by external researchers or by internal ques-
tionnaires to employees and customers.
The problematic link lies between phases 2 and 3.
Having developed conscious focus on preferred
values, there is yet weak rational and empirical evi-
dence of necessary correlated behaviour. A linear
first-order logical follow-up is interrupted by several
disturbing factors. To Socrates it was an implicit
contradiction to claim that people, knowing what
was wrong still do it, or knowing something as right
and avoid doing it. However, as Aristotle pointed
out in his critique of Socrates, a lot of actions are not
executed according to insight or good intentions.
‘For no one, he (Socrates) thought, supposes while
he acts that his action conflicts with what is best; our
action conflicts with what is best only because we
are ignorant. This argument, then, contradicts things
that appear manifestly’ (Aristotle, 1985, p. 174). In
order to describe the ‘incontinent’ (weak character)
he continues: ‘Moreover, the incontinent person is
the sort to pursue excessive bodily pleasure that
conflict with correct reason, but not because he is
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persuaded (it is best)’ (ibid., p. 193). Aristotle shows
in this way how knowledge may not lead to corre-
sponding action, an insight which is paralleled by St.
Paul in his letter to the Romans (Rom. 3, 19). Some
actions are carried out seemingly in accordance with
values opposite to the ones openly cherished by the
actor. Some actions are clearly not intended,
revealing deeper and preconscious layers of inten-
tionality.
Furnham lists four arguments why attitudes are
‘fairly poor predictors of subsequent behaviour’
(Furnham, 1997, p. 205). Attitudes are commonly
viewed as more specific than values, which make
values even less apt to study as determinants of
behaviour. (1) The specificity of attitudes is on a
general an abstract level, while action is highly spe-
cific. (2) A single act is spurious. In order to reveal
attitude, there is a need for aggregating multiple acts
in similar situations over time. (3) Situational factors
may strongly influence attitudes as well as behav-
iours. (4) A given behaviour may relate to a range of
attitudes. It is difficult to know which of these
attitudes would best predict behaviour (ibid., p. 205).
The complex fabric of experience as historically
reported actions within socially constructed meanings
and beliefs in different historical contexts, not to
mention the amount of tacit knowledge involved – all
comprising mental backgrounds for behaviour –
makes it hard to single out specific values as deter-
mining causes of action. It follows that values neither
can be studied simplistic as strategic goals for actions. If
value proliferation follows the scheme of proposi-
tional knowledge, institutions should be far better off
in establishing moral excellence, and catastrophes like
the Enron case would be made impossible. This case
was not led by ignorance, but rather by what Aristotle
would have called incontinent characters.
Human action is complex and not easily pre-
dictable, and the law-like generalizations in social
reality required for the control of value development
is simply unattainable (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 88–
108). Values are vague and general, making them
mere markers of behavioural direction more than
specific instructors of certain actions. In order to
instruct specific behaviour, clear-cut rules of instruc-
tion would in fact do the job more accurately, of
course inflicting other shortcomings and problems
not inferior to the former mentioned. However, the
SO-model in value research is still confided to the
presupposition that individual values held by man-
agers and employees may be more or less accurately
described to harmonize values and visions to a
greater degree of shared values in the organization,
thereby inducing favourable behaviour and organi-
zational excellence similar to Peters and Waterman’s
study (1982).
Treating values as more or less technical ends to
be implemented in organizational practice leads to a
conception of value as top-down intentions from
managers, subsequently functioning as something
unfamiliar being ‘threaded down’ on employees.
However, values are personal, and, therefore, not
easily instructed and implemented by assertion. The
forcing of values creates in most cases resistance and
unwillingness to pay attention, practiced in silent
sabotages of walking slowly, waiting for the idea to
suffocate and the noise to qualm down.
The SO-model of value research is based on the
presumption of language functioning as a ‘mirror’ of
an objectively existing reality ‘out there’ and of the
belief in reality being governed by law-like regu-
larities. This is generally difficult to maintain when
applied to social interaction – people do not ‘stand
still’ long enough to reveal secret ‘natural’ laws, and
the interplay between persons, and between persons
and social contexts slip through the masks of ques-
tionnaires. This raises special difficulties in research
of ‘soft’ and diffuse values. The Wittgensteinian
concept of ‘language games’ seems to catch the
nature of how values function in a far more precise
way than the ‘mirror’ metaphor, resenting fixed
descriptions of given values’ functioning on actions.
Hence, values are crystallizations of meaning and
are as such to a minor extent revealed through
studies of propositional ‘if A – then B’-knowledge
(Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 70). In spite of this, ‘if value A –
then action B’ seems to be the matrix informing
numerous value studies. However, value campaigns
in organizations, as well as SO-studies of values do
not show results according to the amount of invested
efforts (Meglino and Ravlin, 1998, p. 383). This is
‘because a reasonably large proportion of the
research reported here was not performed with the
specific intent of understanding value processes, but
with the idea that values or value congruence would
explain another phenomenon of interest’ (ibid.).
However, it is questionable if ‘understanding value
processes’ is obtainable through the SO-model
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whatsoever. Emotions, habits, expectations, sympa-
thies and cultural patterns of behaviour seem to
influence people’s actions more than rational calcu-
lations. The multitude of value impressions from
numerous social contexts mixed together with the
multitude of possible interpretations of encountered
situations creates an overwhelming and complex
background for choice of action, precisely charac-
terized by the term ‘chaosmos’ coined by Tsoukas
(2005a, pp. 210–229). Ordering this variety as
objective ‘truths’ about reality seems a vanity pro-
ject, oversimplifying and excluding the complex
nature of knowledge. Another sceptic of this per-
spective is Alasdair MacIntyre. He is critical of the
notion of managerial expertise and ability to control
social outcome building on social science supplying
law-like generalizations (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 88).
‘For MacIntyre social theory is active self-reflection
in the context of practice’ (Beadle and Moore, 2006,
p. 326).
The interpretive model applied in studies of
organizational culture escapes the fallacy of the logic
of propositional knowledge in the study of values.
Accepting a hermeneutical understanding of social
knowledge, the researcher collects narratives, stories,
rituals, habits, valuations, metaphors, and routines in
search for profound meanings and hidden values.
Being an outsider, the researcher enjoys a leverage of
a bird’s-eye distant overview, giving opportunities of
disclosure of connections hidden to near-sighted
organizational members. Using different methods
mapping qualities of the culture, the search for a
consistent and over-arching description is shared
with the SO-model of investigation.
Thus, the risk of simplification of the complexity
of human interaction is shared with the SO-model.
‘The question is whether the orientation towards a
unitary meaning excludes the interpretation in terms
of dissonance, ambiguity, and so on (Alvesson and
Sköldberg, 2000, p. 101). Albeit careful attempts to
let the text ‘tell its own truths’, it takes an ordering
mind with its inevitable preconceptions to decide
what should be left out, which parts of the story that
are of greater or lesser importance, and how different
aspects of the story combine to a greater pattern of
basic assumptions and values. Extracting values from
behaviour is similar to shooting into a flock of birds
with a shot-gun. Some are randomly hit, and most
are missed.
The hermeneutic text that attempts to map cul-
ture as patterns of shared values (Schein, 1985) is
especially vulnerable to overlooking contradictions
and variations, and presenting a picture close to
‘truth’. This is all the more misleading, considering
the interpretive basis of this frame of reference. An
art critic cannot be wrong in the interpretation of a
piece of art, only better or worse than others (Alvesson
and Sköldberg, 2000, p. 104).
The interpretive model and the SO model share
the quest for precise descriptions. The researcher is,
just like in the natural sciences, a neutral describer of
objective ‘facts’ (SO model) or an interpreter of
socially constructed meaning (interpretive model),
mainly aiming at disclosing facts of a greater story.
Actions and reactions according to research results
are left to leaders and politicians. Managers thus
‘order’ research, whatever may be the method, to
get precise accounts of situations at hand to make
relevant decisions. Having pointed at the cracks
and limitations of research methods in current value
research, it is time to consider a research method
building on critical collective self-reflection within
the professional body of the organization.
From action to values
In the following discussion, an action research model
of studying values in professional practice within
organizations is presented. Value research is sug-
gested accomplished basically from a constructionist
point of departure, focusing on how meaning/value
is established retrospectively by use of language,
utilizing aspects of the ideas of ‘sensemaking’, ‘tacit
knowledge’ and ‘virtue’. The trick is to combine
important methodological aspects from several tra-
ditions in a multitude of portrayals. What is called
for, are skills of accuracy in reporting empirical data
as in the SO-model, skills of inferring meaning/
value constructs from thick descriptions of words
and actions of the interpretive model and skills
of combining multi-faceted understandings to the
mosaic of relations between action and value. Values
of professional practice in an organization are far too
complex to be captured in grand stories, and far too
important to be left unattended.
Postmodern theories show feeble interest in
empirical research, devoting their interest in
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discussions of how construction of meaning
may unfold. Empiricism, on the other hand, is near-
sightedly preoccupied with technical instruments
of measuring reality ‘as it is’, leaving out disturb-
ing epistemological questions. The proposition
described here is an attempt to apply insights of the
complex fabric of meaning, bringing it in touch with
an empirical world. Alvesson and Sköldberg call
their methodological synopsis of several frames of
reference for ‘reflexive interpretation’, applying
several layers of interpretation on interpretation
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). This may well
cover our own intentions, respecting the need in
organizations for reflexive leverage combined with
the attention to empirical material.
Making sense of values
The simple, but consequential insight that sense is
made retrospectively (Weick, 1995, 2001) has far-
reaching consequences to the efforts of enhancing
value-oriented practice in organizations. Reality
comes before sensemaking – we make retrospective
sense of the situations that we encounter (Weick,
1995, p. 27). He cites Kierkegaard, who points out
how we understand backwards while living forwards
(Weick, 2006, p. 1732). We are like train riders
positioned face backwards reflecting on places we
already left behind. Secondly, social processes are
never complete before one has extracted crucial
meaning or outcome from the processes – after-
wards. An act is not mistaken, it becomes mistaken.
Sensemaking is a rational process, carving meaning
out of action. It represents application of words to
equivocal behaviour, inducing order to more or less
chaotic perceptions and actions. Sensemaking is
especially apt in situations of surprise, when things
happen out of line of expectations, and when pre-
dictions break down.
Values are formulations of worth, representing a
substantial proportion of meaning in an organiza-
tion. However, following the common pattern of
influencing action by proposing values in the man-
ner of propositional knowledge corresponds poorly
with the nature of meaning of human interaction.
Hence, a relevant formulation of values should fol-
low reflections upon actions. Performed actions are
subsequently captured through narratives and stories.
‘Most action is social, even when the other party is
only imagined or implied’ (Weick, 2001, p. 14).
This corresponds with the dialogical nature of
language.
Value as tacit knowledge
Action in organizations is comprehensible and sen-
sible once it is labelled through processes of reflec-
tive interpretations. Thus, organizational narratives,
stories and metaphors are created consecutively as
valuable knowledge of important values. A story
usually ends with a moral point, either being made
explicit (‘as you see, it never pays off to hide the
truth’) or implicit (‘he was never asked again’).
Through sensemaking, processes values become
punctuations of more or less equivocal patterns of
action, resembling newspaper headlines crystallizing
the contents of articles.
However, the domain of values-in-use, which
represents tacit and preconscious levels of inten-
tionality, represents seemingly a problematic area to
sensemaking efforts. The question is if this area is
totally unaccessible, slipping through the masks of
verbal attempts to capture it. An answer to this may
be sought in applying the theory of tacit knowledge.
Tacit knowledge, as introduced by Polanyi (1958,
1966) describes levels of knowledge that are sub-
liminal and pre-rational. Tacit knowledge is ineffa-
ble, personal and episodic, and is situated within
relational and contextual premises, building on
repeated previous experiences. It is ineffable being
out of conscientious focus to the performer. A piano
player uses his or her tacit knowledge of moving his
or her fingers in his or her effort to create music of
high quality, being unable to describe in words ex-
actly what he or she does, and paying no attention to
how his or her fingers touch the piano or how the
hammers touch the strings. It is personal in that
every piano player has skills of his or her own,
making it possible to recognize personal styles dif-
ferent from other piano players (‘This must be Keith
Jarrett. Nobody plays like him’). It is episodic, in that
such knowledge is intimately tied to specific situa-
tions. Work performance incorporates layers of tacit
knowledge in similar ways.
How does this relate to the development of
meaning and values within the organizational
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context? The conscious and rational mind is occu-
pied on the highest of Polanyi’s different hierarchical
levels – the moral level.
We have here a fact which sets a new major task to the
process of evolution: a task which appears the more
formidable as we realize that both this moral sense and
our respect for it presuppose an obedience to com-
mands accepted in defiance of the immemorial scheme
of self-preservation which had dominated the evolu-
tionary process up to this point. (Polanyi, 1966, p. 52)
Moral reflection on values utilizes tacit knowledge
on a subordinate, subliminal level. Tacit knowledge is
thus seemingly not part of the value sensemaking
activity itself – just a necessary precondition. A con-
siderable activity from communicators in the sense-
making process of reflecting value in actions apply
tacit knowledge through turning faces in certain
directions, smiling and frowning on certain cues,
directing or withdrawing attention in relevant
directions. Directing the attention to the subordinate
level of such bodily language would disturb the
advanced and complicated interplay of the reflecting
minds. Just like chess players indulging in a particular
game are unconscious of their knowledge of rules
of the game, persons have their personal ways of
enacting responses to other persons’ performances,
thus giving moral (or immoral) principles manifest
life. This must not be misconceived as subjective
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is owned by the indi-
vidual, but is developed and refined through attention
drawing (Tsoukas, 2005b, p. 157), and extruded
within relational and contextual systems – not in
words, but in ineffable qualities of practice.
So far, it seems as if focusing on tacit knowledge
in the sensemaking process of values may lead into a
blind street. However, certain ways of a person’s
behaviour may be described as ‘nice’, ‘valuable’, and
‘exemplary’, but still being basically ineffable. Still, it
can be talked about. Performances by piano players,
chess players, painters and actors may be highlighted
by critics as epitomes of high quality – without the
slightest ability to pinpoint tacit ingredients of the
performers’ specific artistic knowledge. In the same
manner, certain persons do perform their work,
characterized by others as incarnations of values and
virtues. Exact descriptions of what constitutes their
excellence are impossible to make, and attempts to
do this generally fail.
Tacit knowledge can not be ‘captured’, ‘translated’ or
‘converted’, but only displayed – manifested in what
we do. New knowledge comes about not when the
tacit becomes explicit, but when our skilled perfor-
mance – our practice – is punctuated in new ways
through social interaction. (Tsoukas, 2005b, p. 159)
Tacit knowledge establishes a subliminal and
necessary basis for the development of new insights.
The proliferation of espoused, as well as tacit
knowledge is dependent on collective contextual
frames, allowing for the attention to be drawn to
certain characteristics within the learning situation
(D’Eredita and Barreto, 2006, p. 1837). This implies
a necessity for drawing attention to how tacit
knowledge is displayed in values-in-use. Tacit values
are displayed in personal actions. Tacit values
deserve attention, being models of practice for others
to be inspired by, and thus constituting an important
part of the sensemaking effort of values. Stories of
exemplary, as well as failing conduct are important
raw material of such efforts of displaying tacit values.
The intrinsic values remain mainly ineffable, but
inspire by being ideals of high quality.
Value and virtue
The sensemaking of values through interpreting
actions raises the question of the relationship be-
tween value and virtue. Virtue is defined by
MacIntyre as
an acquired human quality the possession and exercise
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods
which are internal to practices and the lack of which
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.
(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 191)
This definition is formal, as opposed to norma-
tive. It does not specify definite virtues applying to
different practices, but states the existence of such
qualities, and their desirability. The nature of virtue
reveals itself on a basis of socially defined standards
of excellence, on which they are dependent. This
conceptualization of virtue is a result of MacIn-
tyre’s reflection upon the historical fact that dif-
ferent virtues – and virtue theories – are hailed in
different historical contexts – one by Homer, an-
other by Aristotle, a third by the New Testament,
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etc. In order to catch the overall nature and
significance of virtues – and not the least in making
virtues relevant in the highly pluralistic contem-
porary cultures – he extracts the common com-
ponents of virtue and its function through different
historical periods of time. Virtue is thereby
denoting a somewhat narrower conceptual field
than the realm of values – highlighting personal
qualities displayed in action.
There is a convergence of meaning between the
concept of virtue and tacit knowledge. MacIntyre
exemplifies chess and portrait painting as practices. A
virtue confides to excellences in performing chess
playing or rendering a face in an artistic manner
through painting – goods that are qualities in their
own right and not because they give status, money
or self-esteem. Actions, informed by goals of
obtaining fame, acclamation, security or leverage of
competition, are goods external to the same prac-
tices. (Goals of this kind, however, may very well
be formulations of values, being preferences). The
literal formulation in language of the mere contents
of a virtue is thus not straightforward, in a similar
way that Polanyis’ tacit knowledge is ineffable, even
though MacIntyre by no means claims that virtues
are speechless. However, the naming of virtues
within a given practice is at best tentative, and
never fulfilling. So far virtue seems parallel to the
concept of tacit value. Beadle and Moore conclude
their overview article of MacIntyre’s influence on
organizational work by stating that
Much more needs to be done to establish how the
virtues work (literally) in practice to enable the crea-
tion of internal goods, and how such development is
corrupted by the lure of external goods. (Beadle and
Moore, 2006, p. 337)
A collective reflection upon action aiming at
understanding virtue within a practice would be in
conjunction of MacIntyre’s intentions carried out in a
practical context – as for example within a sense-
making retrospective interpretation of organizational
practice. In this effort, it joins forces with Tsoukas and
Vladimirous’ definition of Knowledge Management:
KM is the dynamic process of turning an unreflective
practice into a reflective one by elucidating the rules
guiding the activities of the practice, by helping give a
particular shape to collective understandings, and by
facilitating the emergence of heuristic knowledge.
(Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2005, p. 136)
The scope of reflection on ‘rules guiding activi-
ties’ is naturally supplemented by the inclusion of
reflections on espoused, as well as tacit values, rep-
resenting important punctuations of the discourse of
action. This activity should include reflection on
virtues as well.
However, there are some important distinctions
between virtues and tacit knowledge which have to
be recognized. Virtues are internal to practices, which
by MacIntyre is defined as something else rather than
skills. Bricklaying is a skill, while architecture is a
practice (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 187). To Polanyi, tacit
knowledge certainly is displayed in different skills, as
well as in what MacIntyre calls practices (they both
frequently use playing chess as example). The dis-
cussion following After Virtue raised questions of the
relevance of distinguishing between practices and
skills – is it probable that virtues may only be dis-
played through certain activities and not through
others? Following MacIntyre’s somewhat critical
view of modern organizations, he leaves out more or
less the possibility of organizational enterprise being
a practice, and hence being a context for virtues to
excel. This is clearly a problematic stance. A man-
ager managing a football team (playing football being
a practice according to MacIntyre), is also managing
an organization as well. Managing a farm – and
farming is called a practice – includes managing an
organization of people as well as dealing with
questions of when to sow what, harvesting, etc.
Hence, the important distinction appears to be be-
tween goods internal to a practice from goods external
to one, leaving the distinction between practices and
non-practices of lesser importance. Contrary to
MacIntyre’s reluctance, then, reflections on virtue in
organizational practice are of major importance in
sensemaking processes.
MacIntyre’s distinction of virtue is an important
supplement to the concept of value in general, and
to the concept of tacit value in special within the
practice of sensemaking reflection upon action.
Values and virtues may be approached through
parallel efforts of drawing attention to characteristics of
cherished behaviour.
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Towards a practical model
of action-to-value research
Practical value research is suggested as a sensemaking
process, reflecting upon distinctions of worth dis-
played through actions. Working retrospectively,
conceptualization or punctuation of espoused and
tacit values, as well as virtues may be performed within
an organization as a mutual enterprise. The model will
enhance an action-oriented critical discussion within
the stakeholder community of the organization. An
action-to-value sensemaking reflection within the
community of stakeholders, will inevitably evoke a
critical-emancipatory perspective of social science
(Willmott, 2003, p. 100), inevitably leading to new
understanding and change.
The research process may be designed and led by
a research ‘choreographer’, but engages members of
the organization as co-researchers of values within
their own organizational practice. The focus of the
sensemaking discourse should take as its starting
point reports of empirical findings of organizational
actions accounted by groups within the community.
The choice of frames of actions to be studied and
reported is preferably decided by groups of stake-
holders – i.e. leaders, employees, customers, and
patients – who are challenged to do surveys, inter-
views and/or observations within their own chosen
field of actions to be studied. Inviting research
groups from neighbouring departments to do
inquiries gives the benefit of
The research process should include four dis-
tinctive steps:
1. Choice of fields of action to be studied –
preferably areas of practice with a certain sig-
nificance of meaning to the organization.
The decision should be made through a joint
discussion engaging the participating co-
researching members of the organization.
2. Collection of empirical data of organizational
behaviour. This step is carried out in inde-
pendent research project groups consisting of
organizational members, choosing appropriate
methods according to the nature of the ac-
tions to be studied. Research skills learned
from the SO model of investigation are
appreciated, but not absolutely necessary.
3. Presentation of empirical findings and subse-
quent sensemaking discussions on possible and
adequate value configurations being plausible
from the empirical material. Skills learned
from the interpretive model of qualitative
research, creativity and originality will con-
tribute to the sensemaking process. Attention
drawing to forms of tacit knowledge, as well
as tentative formulations of appearing virtues
and vices should enrich the sensemaking
process.
4. Discourse analysis on which apparent changes
in organizational practice are made plausible
or necessary, as well as formulation of desir-
able values and virtues in further practice.
Conclusion
The proposed value research model is based on
1. the belief that values are socially constructions
of worth, being expressed by practitioners
as conscious and/or preconscious intentions
informing actions, and as expressions of mean-
ing, being inferred onto actions by observers
of the action;
2. the notion that individual values are con-
structed through language in social contexts,
and that professional and organizational val-
ues are products of relational interplay and as
such more than the sum of individual values;
3. the idea that sensemaking of values happens
in retrospect following action;
4. the understanding that new insights build
upon layers of tacit knowledge, like actions
build upon values open to the conscious
mind as well as values hidden from con-
sciousness;
5. regarding similarities between the concept of
value and the concept of virtue, and how
they both are developed;
6. a respect for skills of accuracy in reporting
the empirical world of actions;
7. a readiness to expose different value interpre-
tations in the construction of meaning-upon-
action, welcoming plurality and originality in
the discourse.
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Our intention has been to make a contribution to
the debate on how values and behaviour may be
approached and researched related to professional
practice. By proposing an alternative critical action
research model to the classical SO- and interpretive
models of investigating values, applying concepts
from theories of sensemaking, tacit knowledge, and
virtue ethics, the aim has been to raise action–value–
action sensitivity and consciousness within profes-
sional practice in organizations.
Values are conscious, as well as subconscious
goals, ideals and preferences of worth, expressing
intentionality and shaping directions of action. Val-
ues do not give rule-specific prescriptions of the
action at hand, but points to general courses of
action. Values are most importantly identified in
retrospect through collective reflection in context.
The main process of value clarification should
therefore be made ‘backwards’ as reflections upon
actions already performed, instead of the commonly
entertained practice of value clarification and value
prescription before action – usually called value
implementation. Such reflections may be endeav-
oured as a collective search for meaning within a
stakeholder context. Actions may be studied and
reflected upon by actors themselves in retrospect.
This practice may represent a forceful impetus of
development and change.
Note
1 In brief, one may distinguish the three major tradi-
tions: (1) Values are objective realities corresponding
with man’s capacity to identify and recognize them.
This is the Kantian position, and is supported by Platos’
idea of the true world of ideas. (2) Values are mere sub-
jective likes and dislikes, as in Moores’ emotivism. (3)
Values are social constructs, shifting within different
contexts from time to time. MacIntyre underlines the
importance of narrative and history, and thereby the
changing of contents of values. However, he argues that
values and virtues like friendship and truth-telling are
not relative entities – only their inherent prescriptions
of conduct shift from time to time. MacIntyre is thus
categorized as a critical realist by some commentarians.
The first tradition holds that values are absolute and
transhistoric, while the two other traditions hold that
values are relative, either in an individualistic or in a
contextual–relational sense.
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